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In recent years, scholars have discovered that the American public responds 
to foreign policy issues on the basis of fairly stable broad orientations toward 
international affairs, influenced by a number of demographic, ideological, and 
partisan factors. Although there has been much recent speculation about the role 
that religion plays in shaping such orientations, there are very few empirical analyses 
of that influence. In this article, I use the 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
survey to classify American religious groups on Wittkopf ’s (1990) classic dimensions 
of foreign policy attitudes: militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. 
I find rather different religious constituencies for each perspective, with Evangelical 
Protestants and religious traditionalists from other faiths most supportive of militant 
internationalism, while ethnoreligious minorities and religious modernists are most 
likely to back cooperative internationalism.
Keywords American foreign policy, religious groups, militant internationalism,  
                       cooperative international
Introduction
One of the most fascinating tasks confronting the analyst of American foreign 
policy is attempting to illuminate the characteristics of public opinion on 
international issues, and to assess its influence on the policy-making process. 
Since World War II, the conventional wisdom, couched in the “Almond-Lippmann 
consensus” (Holsti 2004, 28-40), held that most Americans were uninterested 
in, and ill-informed about international events, that their orientation toward 
particular issues lacked coherence and stability, and therefore that public opinion 
exerted little if any impact on the president and his foreign policy advisors in 
their pursuit of national interests.
While there is much evidence to suggest that Americans’ interest in, and 
information about, foreign affairs has not grown significantly, scholars have 
discovered that public attitudes on specific foreign policy issues are determined 
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by identifiable and structured beliefs that are relatively stable over time.  Some 
studies of the mass public have uncovered rather coherent attitude structures 
that allow individuals to be the “cognitive misers” analysts have often portrayed 
them to be (for a review, see Holsti 2004). And although scholars have identified 
some of the social, ideological, and demographic influences on these attitudinal 
structures, much of the variation remains unexplained.
One potential influence, religion, has been largely neglected. Although 
scholars increasingly incorporate religious factors in studies of voting, party 
politics, and public opinion (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009), there has been 
much less interest in connecting religion to foreign policy opinion. Some even 
deny that there is anything to study. For example, Kohut and Stokes’s extensive 
review of Americans’ attitudes concludes that “with the exception of policy 
toward Israel, religion has little bearing on how they think about international 
affairs” (2006, 94). Few political scientists have taken seriously J. Bryan Hehir’s 
argument that “religious convictions and concerns” have permeated U.S. foreign 
policy since World War II (2001, 36).
The neglect of religion by political scientists has been highlighted by 
mounting interest from journalists (Mead 2004; 2006; Phillips 2006; Clark 2007), 
historians (Boyer 2005; Guyatt 2007; Preston 2012; Ruotsila 2008), diplomats 
(Carter 2005; Albright 2006), religion scholars (Northcott 2004; Marsh 2007), 
sociologists (Martin 1999; Derber and Magrass 2008), communications analysts 
(Domke 2004), and even philosophers (Singer 2004). These authors have made 
strong claims both for religion’s influence on Americans’ foreign policy views and 
the resulting impact on political leaders. Such assertions are even more common 
abroad, both among intellectual elites and in the mass public. No one reading 
European journals of opinion would doubt that many intellectuals there believe 
that American foreign policy reflects religious influences, or that this notion has 
widespread appeal among ordinary citizens as well (Kohut and Stokes 2006). 
Many would agree with a French author Susan George that American religious 
beliefs “have foreign policy consequences” (2008, 146).
There are two major—and not entirely compatible—themes in this massive 
body of work. The hegemonic theme emphasizes the way religion encourages an 
American foreign policy characterized by militarism, unilateralism, moralism, 
and nationalistic assertiveness. This genre usually focuses on Evangelicals, whose 
religious beliefs are labeled variously as “fundamentalist,” “premillennialist,” 
“dispensationalist,” “literalist,” or “messianic.” These views are often connected 
to those infusing earlier themes in American history such as Manifest Destiny 
or Special Providence (McCartney 2004; Judis 2005). Such attitudes, it is often 
asserted, were especially influential during the George W. Bush administration (for 
typical examples, see Kohut and Stokes 2006).
An alternative altruistic theme (Wuthnow 2009) has also emerged, one 
with a very different emphasis, even when drawn from observation of the 
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same religious groups. Some journalists have focused on Evangelical activity, 
supported by a variable cast of other religious groups, addressing a range of 
international crises: fighting for human rights and religious freedom, protecting 
the global environment, expanding international relief and rescue operations, 
combatting AIDS in Africa, and working for more ambitious economic 
development programs. Indeed, Nicolas Kristof, a New York Times columnist 
not known for fundamentalist sympathies, once referred to Evangelicals as “the 
new internationalists” (Kristof 2002). Some academic observers have concurred, 
finding redeeming traits in the foreign policy concerns of conservative Christians 
(Hertzke 2004; Mead 2006; den Dulk 2007; Farr 2008; Wuthnow 2009; McCleary 
2009). Others have claimed that these policy tasks are creating new attitudes 
among religious traditionalists and fostering new alliances across old religious 
divides. Weyl (2009), for example, finds that religious liberals and conservatives 
are making common cause on this altruistic agenda, overcoming old divisions.
Unfortunately, the works embroidering both themes are often based on 
simplistic analyses of American religion. First of all, they tend to focus on 
religious leaders, with little attention to those in the pews, despite some enormous 
opinion gaps between organizational elites and the rank and file (Guth et al. 
1997). Secondly, the attention is often centered too narrowly on Evangelicals. 
Few analysts consider the other 75% of the public, creating an analytic dualism 
that arrays Evangelicals against “secular” opinion (presumably everyone else). 
But other religious groups also have distinctive attitudes toward foreign policy, 
as Alfred Hero (1973) demonstrated long ago. Catholic and Mainline Protestant 
churches, as well as Jewish leaders, have long sought to influence both the 
public and policymakers (Hanson 1987; Rock 2011). Nor does this dualism 
recognize that the growing ranks of religiously unaffiliated Americans may have 
characteristic preferences (Hansen 2011). Thus, the extant literature overstates the 
distinctiveness of one religious group, ignores the potential influence of others, 
and treats American religion simplistically.  
This article presents a broader picture of the religious factors that shape 
public attitudes on American policy. First, I describe two fundamental 
perspectives that dominate the scholarly literature on religion’s political role 
in America, the ethnoreligious and religious restructuring theories, and suggest 
ways that each may help account for foreign policy attitudes. Then I examine 
the distribution of religious opinion on broad foreign policy orientations, using 
the classic “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” typology of militant internationalism 
and cooperative internationalism. Although not subsuming every foreign policy 
issue confronting the United States, these orientations have proved remarkably 
stable over time, despite changing national agendas (Holsti 2004; Eichenberg 
2007). Also, each corresponds to one broad theme in the literature, with 
militant internationalism representing the hegemonic theme, and cooperative 
internationalism, the altruistic one. Indeed, historian Andrew Preston has 
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adopted biblical metaphors for these two dimensions of American foreign policy, 
with militant internationalism represented as the “sword of the Spirit,” and 
cooperative ventures as “the shield of faith” (Preston 2012).
Religious Groups in American Politics
There are two major competing interpretations of religious alignments in 
American politics. Ethnoreligious theory emphasizes the religious groups 
that migrated to America and often multiplied upon reaching her shores. 
As historians have argued, 19th century electoral politics consisted largely 
of assembling winning coalitions of contending ethnoreligious groups. Well 
into the 20th century, the Republican Party (GOP) represented historically 
dominant Mainline Protestant churches, such as Episcopalians, Presbyterians, 
and Methodists, while Democrats spoke for religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, 
and southern Evangelicals. By the 1980s, Mainline Protestants had dwindled 
in number; Evangelicals had moved toward the GOP; the ancient Catholic-
Democratic alliance had frayed; Black Protestants had become a critical 
Democratic bloc (Kellstedt and Guth 2013). Growing religious diversity has 
added Latino Catholics and Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and many 
others to the equation, usually on the Democratic side. Even today many analysts 
think in ethnoreligious terms, referring to the “Evangelical,” “Catholic,”  “Jewish,” 
or “Muslim” vote. Although the assumptions underlying this framework are often 
incompletely articulated, historians usually argued that ethnoreligious groups 
held differing worldviews, cultural preferences, and negative reference groups—
all shaping their views on public policy (Swierenga 2009). 
A few historical and contemporary examples illustrate the relevance of 
ethnoreligious traditions for attitudes. The distinctive hostility of Irish Catholics 
toward the American alliance with Great Britain and the isolationism of 
German Lutherans and Catholics during World War I are just two examples of 
ethnoreligious influence. Catholic anticommunism in the 1940s and 1950s was 
shaped not only by Church pronouncements against that “Godless” system, but 
also by ethnoreligious solidarity with Eastern European relatives under Soviet 
domination. The persistent support of American Jews for Israel and the more 
recent interest of Black Protestants in policy toward Africa are just two examples 
of contemporary concerns of a host of American “ethnoreligious fragments” 
(Uslaner 2007). Indeed, the late Samuel P. Huntington feared that U.S. policy 
might be unduly influenced by such ethnoreligious “diasporas” (Huntington 
2004, 285-91). More positive observers might see in the numerical growth of such 
minorities the prospect for a new kind of internationalism: As America comes to 
resemble the “United Nations” (UN) religiously, it might look more favorably on 
the UN and other multilateral institutions. 
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An alternative to the ethnoreligious approach is the religious restructuring 
or culture wars theory, introduced first by sociologist Robert Wuthnow (1988) 
to explain growing divisions in American faith traditions. This view was brought 
into common political parlance by James Hunter’s Culture Wars: The Struggle to 
Define America (1991). Hunter saw new religious battles emerging within the old 
traditions, based on theological differences: “Orthodox” believers accepted “an 
external, definable, and transcendent authority,” and adhered firmly to traditional 
doctrines, while “progressives” replaced old religious tenets with new ones based 
on experience or scientific rationality (Hunter 1991, 44). The progressives were 
often joined by the growing numbers of secular Americans who reject religion 
entirely but see morality in a similar vein (Hansen 2011). 
These religious divisions quickly congealed around issues such as abortion, 
feminism, and gay rights but soon showed evidence of infusing other attitudes as 
well. Indeed, the dominant theme of the literature cited earlier often reports the 
echoes of “culture war” battle cries in foreign policy debates. Some conflicts are 
extensions of domestic politics, as when Catholic and Evangelical traditionalists 
fight population control policies of American aid agencies or other international 
bodies, or insist on “abstinence only” strategies for combatting AIDS in Africa. 
More significant, perhaps, are the less obvious connections, by which religious 
traditionalists may identify American foreign objectives with divine goals, or 
infuse U.S. military action with divine purpose. And although the impact of 
progressive views has been less discussed, the communitarian social theology of 
many Mainline Protestants and liberal Catholics should be conducive to a more 
cooperative foreign policy, focused on social welfare, economic development, and 
the natural environment (Kurtz and Fulton 2002).
Although Hunter’s culture war thesis captivated some scholars and 
pundits, most analysts concluded that his dualist model was too simplistic, 
that moral battle lines shifted from issue to issue, and that many citizens were 
noncombatants (Williams 1997). Some scholars have confirmed, however, some 
of the political cleavages Hunter envisioned (Layman 2001), but old markers of 
ethnoreligious tradition (and many other factors) still influence public attitudes. 
Thus, any analysis of the religious politics of foreign policy attitudes requires 
both ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives, as well as an assessment 
of nonreligious influences. Ethnoreligious traditions include Evangelical and 
Mainline Protestants, white Catholics, Latino Catholics and Protestants, Black 
Protestants, Jews, other religions, and “Nones.”  The new culture war divisions 
within the larger Christian groups pit traditionalists, who are orthodox in belief 
and active in conventional religious rites, against modernists, more heterodox and 
less conventional in religious expression and engagement. 
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Militant and Cooperative Internationalisms among Religious 
Groups
Although it is clear that religion has distinct influences over a few specific issues, 
such as Mideast policy (Mayer 2004; Guth 2011b) or “American exceptionalism” 
(Guth 2012), the focus of this article is on how faith undergirds broader policy 
orientations. As noted above, early studies found that most Americans were 
poorly informed about and uninterested in foreign policy, but more recently 
scholars have found that despite such cognitive limitations they do hold 
overarching, stable, and rational foreign policy predispositions that shape 
their reaction to specific questions (Eichenberg 2007). Indeed, there is now an 
expansive literature on how American citizens organize their predispositions 
on foreign policy issues (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Page and Bouton 2006). As 
Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis noted almost two decades ago, the “most widely 
used structure for American foreign policy beliefs is the Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau 
model” (1995, 313). Although that assessment is almost two-decades old, it is still 
valid today (cf. Holsti 2004; Eichenberg 2007). 
Wittkopf (1990) proposed that since the 1970s public attitudes on most 
foreign policy issues have been subsumed by two dimensions: militant 
internationalism (MI) and cooperative internationalism (CI). Although the precise 
components of each dimension vary with the era and the available survey items, 
MI historically focused on the dangers presented by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), the necessity of a strong military, willingness to use force 
to protect American interests, and a zero-sum interpretation of international 
conflict. After the demise of the Soviet Union, other enemies provided a 
substitute focus, such as Islamic terrorists after 2001 (Smidt 2005). CI, on the 
other hand, stressed the value of international cooperation and multilateral 
institutions such as the UN, and usually incorporated “North-South” issues such 
as hunger and economic development (Holsti 2004) and, more recently, climate 
change (cf. Croft 2009). 
As these two dimensions were largely independent, Wittkopf combined 
MI and CI to produce a four-fold typology for citizens: hardliners (high on MI 
and low on CI), internationalists (high on both), accommodationists (low on 
MI, high on CI), and isolationists (low on both scales). Several scholars have 
confirmed that these groups react in predictable ways when confronted with 
foreign policy choices, although some critics argue for the existence of at least one 
additional dimension, usually involving international issues with strong domestic 
implications, such as trade and immigration policies (Chittick, Billingsley and 
Travis 1995). Nevertheless, almost any empirical exploration of an extensive range 
of foreign policy items produces at least two major dimensions interpretable as 
militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism.
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In previous analyses of the 2008 National Survey of Religion and Politics 
(NSRP) (Guth 2010a) and the American National Election Study (ANES) 
(Guth 2011a), I found strong evidence of distinct religious influences on both 
dimensions, but especially on militant internationalism. Nevertheless, each 
study had limitations: The NSRP included a rich battery of religious questions, 
but limited foreign policy items, especially on cooperative internationalism. 
The ANES had few religious measures and limited policy items, but a richer 
array of other variables sometimes thought to influence foreign policy attitudes, 
such as ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. The present analysis uses the 2012 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) survey. The survey series conducted 
regularly by the Council has long been regarded as the “gold standard” for 
analysis of American public opinion on international issues (Wittkopf 1990; Page 
and Bouton 2006). Indeed, earlier Chicago Council surveys were the basis of 
Wittkopf ’s work and that of many other scholars (Holsti 2004). 
Thus, the 2012 CCGA survey permits development of very robust measures 
of militant and cooperative internationalisms, the “dependent” variables. 
Unfortunately, like earlier CCGA surveys, the 2012 iteration has only a few items 
on religion. Despite this limitation, some earlier studies have noted fascinating 
influences of religion on specific issues (Page and Bouton 2006), although these 
have not been explored systematically. If, despite the measurement limitations, 
the same broad patterns of religious opinion appear as in my earlier studies of the 
NSRP and ANES, confidence in the findings will be enhanced.
Data and Methods
The first task in the analysis was to create a militant internationalism (MI) score 
to tap that dimension, one that Eichenberg (2007, 393) has argued is the single 
most important factor in conditioning a citizen’s international “world view.” 
For this purpose, I used scores on the unrotated first dimension of a principal 
components analysis of 18 questions which revealed a preference for reliance on 
military might to confront perceived dangers of the contemporary international 
environment, especially in combatting terrorism, Islamic movements, and the 
rise of potentially hostile foreign powers such as China. This highly reliable score 
(theta=.87) provides an excellent measure of this dimension. 
The CCGA survey also included 17 items which clearly tap cooperative 
internationalism: preferences for the primacy of diplomacy, reliance on 
multilateral institutions such as the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), cooperative efforts with allies, and international agreements, with a 
special concern for “humanitarian” problems such as global climate change, 
world hunger, and human rights. Here, too, I use scores from the unrotated first 
dimension of a principal components analysis. This procedure also produces 
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a highly reliable score (theta=.86). (See the Appendix for the items and factor 
loadings for both scores.)
Although the CCGA survey excels in tapping foreign policy attitudes, it 
ignores best practice in measuring religion. Ideally, surveys should ascertain 
precise religious affiliations, measure at least some central religious beliefs, and 
determine the degree of religious observance or commitment (Smidt, Kellstedt 
and Guth 2009). In this case the analyst is put in the classic position of attempting 
to produce silk purses with unpromising raw materials. The survey has four 
queries on religion. The first determines broad religious traditions (Q1040): “What 
is your religious preference?  Is it Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, some other 
religion, or no religion?” The second (Q1040B) asks Christians: “Would that be 
Catholic, Protestant or Other Christian?” The third (Q1041) requests that those 
responding “some other religion” to the first question to specify that religion. 
Finally, Q1042 asks all Christians: “Which one of these words best describes your 
kind of Christianity—fundamentalist, evangelical, charismatic, Pentecostal, or 
moderate to liberal?”
Examination of the questions as well as the resulting data reveals several 
problems. First, it is clear that many members of Protestant denominations 
answer “Other Christian” when asked the second question, and that many who 
reply “some other religion” are in fact Protestants or Catholics, as revealed by 
their answers to the follow-up probe. Finally, the “kind of Christianity” question 
uses terminology derived from divisions in the Protestant family (“fundamentalist, 
evangelical, charismatic, Pentecostal”) or imprecise labels drawn more from 
politics than religion (“moderate to liberal”). Indeed, scholars of religion and 
political behavior have largely abandoned such “religious identification” as a 
primary variable. Although this creates a considerable degree of measurement 
error involved in these questions, there is little alternative but to incorporate 
them in the analysis.
Using these questions, I first created estimates for membership in several 
major American ethnoreligious groups. Without denominational affiliation data, 
I could not assign white Protestants to Evangelical and Mainline traditions but 
could identify Latino and Black Protestants, European (white) Catholics and the 
growing contingent of Latino Catholics, as well as Jews. Unfortunately, Muslims, 
Hindus, Buddhists, and other “minority” traditions are too few to analyze 
individually but are assigned to the “Other religions” category, also occupied 
by a variety of “new age” and “off-brand” religious groups. The much discussed 
contingent of religious “Nones” (see Hansen 2011) are identified by that response 
to the first question and was augmented by those who answered “some other 
religion,” but listed agnostic, atheist or “none” on the follow-up query.
The CCGA survey presents more of a challenge for producing a religious 
restructuring variable. In the absence of belief questions, the “religious 
identification” approach leaves much to be desired in differentiating traditionalist 
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and modernist religious views. The labels used are not common to all American 
religious traditions, and are not always understood by all members of the 
traditions in which they are commonly employed (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 
2009). Despite these limitations, I classify respondents taking the “fundamentalist, 
evangelical, charismatic, Pentecostal” label as “traditionalists,” and those taking 
either the “moderate to liberal” or no label as “modernists.” 
Although this distinction permits creation of “traditionalist” and “modernist” 
factions within the larger religious traditions, in the absence of detailed 
denominational affiliations it must also be used to distinguish Evangelical and 
Mainline Protestants. This distinction is, of course, an important one. Evangelical 
Protestants and Mainline Protestants are quite distinct religiously. Evangelicals 
“typically affirm personal salvation through Jesus Christ, call individuals to 
conversion…and regard the Bible to be the final authority concerning all matters 
of faith and practice” (Smidt 2013, 64). Mainline Protestants tend to see validity 
in many religious traditions, stress religious nurture rather than conversion, 
and hold “lower” views of Scripture. Evangelicals are also more traditionalist on 
moral issues, such as abortion, gay rights, and gender equality, while Mainliners 
are more liberal. And in recent decades ideological differences in other areas of 
public policy have separated the two traditions.
Lacking denominational affiliation data, then, I classify white Protestants 
who take traditionalist labels as “Evangelical,” and those who do not as “Mainline.” 
This produces estimates that are obviously too small for the Evangelical tradition 
and too large for the Mainline and probably reduces the distinctiveness of the 
two traditions (cf. Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009), but there is no alternative. 
Although these theological labels are less familiar in other Christian traditions, 
I divide each of these into “traditionalists” and “modernists” as well. As will be 
evident, even this crude theological distinction produces some real differences 
(The very few Latter-day Saints or “Mormons” identified in the survey were 
assigned to the Evangelical Protestant category on the empirical grounds that 
their political attitudes and behavior mimic those of Evangelicals).
 To recapitulate, the combination of ethnoreligious tradition and theological 
orientation produces these categories: Evangelicals (“traditionalist” white 
Protestants), Mainline Protestants (“modernist” white Protestants), as well as 
White Catholics, Latino Protestants, Latino Catholics, and Black Protestants—
all divided into traditionalist and modernist groups—and, finally, Jews, “Other 
religions,” and “Nones,” those claiming no religion at all (see Table 1 for these 
groups). If the analysis finds significant religious differences on militant and 
cooperative internationalism, it is highly likely that better religious measures 
would produce even more powerful results. 
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Findings and Discussion
With these data construction exercises completed, I am ready to test the influence 
of religion on foreign policy orientations. I will locate religious groups on the MI 
and CI scales, run multivariate analyses on the influence of religious and other 
factors over each dimension, and then present evidence on the placement of 
religious groups within Wittkopf ’s classic typology. 
Militant Internationalism
As noted above, much of the speculative literature on religious influence focuses 
on the MI dimension of opinion, with a primary emphasis on Evangelicals. Also, 
the limited empirical work done recently has also addressed this “hegemonic” 
dimension: Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson (2008, 308) investigated “messianic 
militarism”; Froese and Mencken (2009, 105) considered the effects of “sacralization 
ideology” on support for “neoconservative foreign policy ideology”; and 
Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) found Evangelicals supportive of 
“hawkish” foreign policy toward the Middle East. In an earlier study, I discovered 
that Evangelicals and other theological conservatives strongly supported the so-
called “Bush Doctrine,” with its emphasis on military might, unilateralism and 
pre-emptive use of force (Guth 2009). Thus, based on previous research I expect 
distinct religious influences here, especially from Evangelicals. 
Of course, membership in other religious groups might also shape attitudes. 
Mainline Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church have often adopted 
policies critical of American military power and skeptical about its use. Both 
traditions opposed use of American troops in the Gulf Wars, especially the second 
one (Wald 1992; Tipton 2007). And although many of the remaining religious 
groups have been less outspoken on such issues, I suspect they may also exhibit 
distinct influence on members’ perspectives. In previous work, I found that 
secular respondents, members of religious minorities, and religious modernists 
were less supportive of the Bush Doctrine and militant internationalism (Guth 
2009; 2010a; 2010b). Also, in a related vein, these same groups are skeptical of 
American “exceptionalism,” the belief that the United States has a unique role to 
play in international affairs (Guth 2012).
In the first column of Table 1, I report the score of each religious group, using 
a simple 100-point scale for ease of illustration. Both ethnoreligious tradition and 
theological orientation obviously produce different levels of support for militant 
internationalism. Evangelicals (traditionalist white Protestants), traditionalist 
Latino Protestants and Catholics, and traditionalist white Catholics all score quite 
high on this scale. Mainliners (modernist white Protestants), modernist white 
Catholics, both Black Protestant groups, and Jews score in the middle. Latino 
modernists in both Protestant and Catholic traditions exhibit lower scores, with 
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the “Other religions” and large bloc of “Nones” on the non-militant pole.
The next three columns report the results of three multiple regression 
analyses, successively incorporating richer explanatory frameworks (cf. Page 
and Bouton 2006). The first regression uses the religious categories as variables 
predicting militant internationalism. (The omitted reference category comprises 
Mainline Protestants and unclassified respondents; both groups score almost 










































































































































































Source: Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 2012.
a Mainline Protestants and unclassifiable respondents comprise the omitted reference category.
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
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exactly at the sample mean.) This procedure reveals the distinctiveness of 
Evangelicals on the militant side of the scale, buttressed by the traditionalists 
in most other religious groups. At the same time, members of “Other religions” 
and “secular” respondents dominate on the non-militant side. Note that 
religious group membership alone explains a very respectable 11% of the 
variance. Incorporating other demographic variables in the regression in the 
second column bolsters that figure to 15%, with older, Southern and wealthier 
respondents tending toward militant attitudes, while the highly educated move 
in the other direction. Note, however, that incorporation of the demographics 
hardly budges the coefficients for religious groups. The effects of religious 
affiliation and belief are not artifacts of demography but persist even when these 
basic characteristics are accounted for. 
The regression in the last column of Table 1 incorporates what Page and 
Bouton (2006) call “basic attitudes.” Not surprisingly, their measure of “active 
part internationalism” (the underlying belief that the United Sates should play an 
active part in the world) encourages militant internationalism, as do conservative 
and Republican self-identifications, bringing the total variance explained to 24%. 
Although some of the religious effects are clearly mediated by these ideological 
measures, others retain statistically significant direct effects, most notably that 
for Evangelicals on the “militant” side, and “Other religions” and “Nones” in the 
opposite direction. 
In short, the evidence from the CCGA survey confirms earlier findings 
that members of the Evangelical community and their traditionalist brethren 
in other Christian groups do tend to support strong military power while 
“minority” religions and secular Americans are much less committed to 
militant internationalism. The influence of some of these religious tendencies is 
mediated in part by partisan and ideological orientations: Evangelicals and other 
traditionalists are Republican and conservative while ethnoreligious “minorities” 
and seculars are Democratic and liberal. However, many of the religious effects 
are direct, exceeding those explained by the partisan and ideological affinities of 
each religious group. Clearly, both religious tradition and theological orientation 
have independent influence on militant internationalism. 
Cooperative Internationalism
What about cooperative internationalism? Although Mainline denominations 
(Kurtz and Fulton 2002) and the Catholic Church (Hanson 1987) have been 
strong proponents of multilateral cooperation to solve problems of hunger 
and poverty around the world, neither the critical nor the empirical literature 
has focused much on these issues. As I noted above, press reports increasingly 
suggest that religious factors may operate quite differently on altruistic foreign 
policy, involving international human rights, Third-World poverty, economic 
development, and global climate change. Although such conclusions are often 
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based on pronouncements by religious elites or studies of religious interest group 
activity (e.g., Hertzke 2004; Farr 2008), evidence for the influence of religious 
variables on public attitudes is mixed (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008; Guth 2010a; 
2011a). In part, this may reflect the “newness” of such issues or, as Wuthnow 
(2009) argues, the lack of pervasive and effective engagement strategies by 
religious leaders at the congregational level. Or perhaps these are “hard issues,” 








































































































































































Source: Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 2012.
a Mainline Protestants and unclassifiable respondents comprise the omitted reference category.
*p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001.
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too complex to assimilate quickly into an overarching ideological or religious 
perspective (cf. Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981). Finally, analysis has been hindered 
by the paucity of surveys including extensive items tapping this dimension along 
with adequate religious measures.
Given the CCGA survey’s richer lode of cooperative policy items, I may 
find stronger results here. And in fact, that is the case. Table 2 reports analyses 
identical to those for militant internationalism in Table 1. Although the militant 
and cooperative internationalism scales are only weakly correlated (r=.10), 
religious group patterns on cooperative internationalism often mirror those on 
the other dimension. As the first column illustrates, Evangelicals are the least 
“cooperative,” followed by traditionalists among white Catholics and Latino 
Protestants while Latino Catholics, Black Protestants, Jews, “Other religions,” and 
“Nones” score more highly on cooperative internationalism. 
These patterns are summarized by the first regression, where religious 
group membership explains a respectable 9% of the variance. The addition 
of demographic variables bolsters that figure only a little, with women and 
Southerners scoring more highly on cooperation, and those with higher income 
lower on the scale. Once again, note that inclusion of the demographics in the 
second regression leaves religious group influences largely unchanged. However, 
the same is not true when “basic attitudes” are incorporated. “Active part 
internationalists” are supportive of cooperative internationalism (as they were 
of militant internationalism), and ideology and partisanship have a big impact: 
Conservatism and Republican identification work powerfully against cooperative 
internationalism. (Or, to put it the other way, liberalism and Democratic 
identification work for it.) And the ideological variables absorb almost all of the 
effects of religious group membership: Only modernist Latino Catholics and 
Black Protestants exhibit any additional push toward cooperative internationalism 
beyond that channeled by their ideology and party identification. The political 
variables also bolster the variance explained to 31%, an impressive performance. 
Religious Groups and the Militant/Cooperative Internationalist Typology
All in all, these findings suggest that those who analyze foreign policy opinion 
would be well advised to incorporate sophisticated religious measures to 
maximize explanatory power, as religious groups clearly differ in orientation 
toward militant and cooperative internationalism. As a final step, I combine the 
two scales to produce the classic Wittkopf typology (see Figure 1), following 
the customary procedure of dividing respondents at the zero point on each 
factor score to create the categories of hardliners (high on MI and low on CI), 
internationalists (high on both), accommodationists (low on MI, high on CI), and 
isolationists (low on both scales).
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This assigns roughly a fifth of the sample to each of the hardliner and 
isolationist camps, almost a third to the internationalist, and one quarter to the 
accommodationist group (Table 3).
As the first line in Table 3 shows, Evangelicals are overrepresented in the 
hardliner camp, exceeded only by the small contingent of Latino Protestant 
traditionalists. Most remaining Evangelicals fall into the internationalist 
category, with very few accommodationists and only a few more isolationists. 
Mainline Protestants, on the other hand, are quite evenly distributed, closely 
mimicking the entire sample, with a few less accommodationists and a few more 
isolationists. Latino Protestant modernists are more inclined than the general 
public toward the hardliner camp—and, even more, toward isolationism. (Given 
the relatively small numbers in this religious group we should be cautious about 
Table 3. Distribution of Wittkopf ’s Foreign Policy Orientations by Religious Groups













































































































Total 21.5 31.9 26.1 20.5 (1838)
Source: Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 2012.
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the distribution.)
Catholics differ both by ethnicity and theological orientation. White 
Catholic traditionalists are concentrated in the hardliner and internationalist 
camps while their modernist co-parishioners include many fewer hardliners and 
more accommodationists. Both white Catholic theological groups have fewer 
isolationists than most other religious groups and the general public, perhaps 
befitting members of an “international” religious body. Latino Catholics are 
unlikely to be hardliners, with internationalists dominating among traditionalists 
and accommodationists having a plurality among modernists. Finally, Black 
Protestants differ little by theological orientation, as both factions have an 
overwhelming preponderance (and about equal numbers) of internationalists and 
accommodationists.
Not surprisingly, a solid majority of Jews are internationalists, with 
accommodationists representing the largest remaining contingent. Among 
members of “Other religions,” accommodationists form a plurality, with 
internationalists the next most numerous. Note that virtually no members 
of this diverse category fall into the hardliner camp, but about a quarter are 
isolationists. Finally, the growing contingent of the religiously unaffiliated (an 
increasingly significant political force in American politics) also includes few 
hardliners and somewhat more numerous internationalists, but has a plurality of 
accommodationists and a fairly sizeable number of isolationists as well.
Any exact comparison with earlier findings is impossible, given the great 
variation in the subject and number of foreign policy items and varying religious 
measures in the surveys I have used—the 2008 NSRP, the 2008 ANES, and the 
2012 CCGA. But the pattern of religious group location on both dimensions 
of foreign policy attitudes is quite consistent. For example, analyses of the 2008 
NSRP and the 2012 CCGA both classify 42% to 43% of Evangelicals as hardliners, 
despite the use of very different measures of the foreign policy and religion 
variables and possible opinion changes from 2008 to 2012. Estimates for other 
religious groups are also usually within a very few percentage points of each other 
(cf. Guth 2010a). This suggests that such findings are quite robust and at least 
somewhat impervious to limitations in the measures employed—and, perhaps—
to changes over time. 
Intriguingly, findings here are also fairly consistent with the modest evidence 
available on historical patterns. Not only do the results usually match with the 
broad descriptions of religious group opinion by Hero (1973), but Wittkopf ’s own 
cursory analysis of the even cruder religious categories available in early CCGA 
studies showed that in the 1970s and 1980s “Protestants” tended to be hardliners, 
Catholics and Jews (especially the latter) were internationalists (cf. Greenberg and 
Wald 2001), and “Nones” were accommodationists (1990, 44). Had Wittkopf been 
able to differentiate ethnoreligious traditions further and also utilize a theological 
measure, his findings might have been even more compelling.
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Conclusions
While political scientists and international relations specialists have paid 
increasing attention to the role of religious organizations and movements in world 
politics, there has been little sustained analysis of how religious factors influence 
American public attitudes on foreign policy. I have investigated two recent themes 
in the journalistic and academic coverage of religion and American foreign 
policy. The hegemonic theme stressed the influence that religious traditionalists, 
especially Evangelicals, have in supporting militant internationalism. I find that 
a good bit of the speculation is correct: Evangelicals and other traditionalists 
are indeed more likely to favor such policies. Based on findings elsewhere, I 
suspect that religious influences are mediated by other belief factors such as civil 
religion, social traditionalism, moralism, and dispensationalism (Guth 2011a). 
In the broadest sense, these hardliners constituted a large part of the coalition 
supporting the policies of the George W. Bush administration. On the other hand, 
minority ethnoreligious groups, theological modernists and secular citizens often 
fell on the other end of MI. These groups are not without potential political clout; 
in combination, they outnumber traditionalist Evangelicals in the mass public.
I have also considered the altruistic theme by identifying religious influences 
on cooperative internationalism although these influences are not quite as sharp 
or as clearly defined. In part, this may be due to the relative newness of some CI 
issues on the international and national agenda. Religious and political elites have 
not had the time—or, perhaps, the ability—to educate their constituencies on 
the connection between religious faith and these issues. Although there are a few 
commonalities in support for MI and CI perspectives, there is a clear tendency 
for religious factors providing support for one to have the opposite influence on 
the other agenda. Also, although traditionalist religious beliefs work against CI, 
modernist beliefs favor it. In addition, the “new internationalism” of American 
religion augurs well for cooperative internationalism, as members of burgeoning 
“minority” ethnoreligious groups are among its strongest supporters. 
Thus, both ethnoreligious theory and restructuring theory play a role in 
explaining religion’s contributions to Americans’ foreign policy orientations. Still, 
at this point it is not clear whether a new, consensual cooperative agenda might 
eventually attract support from a wider range of American religious groups, 
or whether this agenda might ultimately end up being absorbed by militant 
internationalism. The large Evangelical community will be an important actor 
here. Currently, divisions over the cooperative internationalism agenda have 
driven some major fissures through this community. Some Evangelical leaders, 
such as megachurch pastor Rick Warren, aggressively aggressively champion 
environmentalism, human rights, and international development, but they face 
adamant resistance from entrenched conservatives, such as Focus on the Family 
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founder James Dobson (for such controversies, see Sheler 2009). The consistency 
of Evangelical support for militant internationalism and lack of enthusiasm 
for cooperative internationalism apparent in surveys from both 2008 and 2012 
suggest that the new Evangelical elites have at best made limited progress in their 
campaign. Even young Evangelicals, the supposed adherents of more liberal or 
“cooperative” policies, do not appear to differ much from their elders on foreign 
policy (Smith and Johnson 2010).
Indeed, such findings suggest the need to investigate further other aspects of 
religious influence. The influence of religious leaders is an important subject for 
inquiry. Although denominational elites and parish clergy often have distinctive 
attitudes on foreign policy, evidence for their influence over their congregations 
is mixed. Some studies find that persuasion does take place (Wald 1992), but 
most see little impact (Wuthnow and Lewis 2008). In a related vein, there is 
some indication that religious participation and congregational interaction may 
strengthen adherence to the “normative” perspective within a faith community, 
but there is little evidence that participation has a distinct independent effect 
on international attitudes (Guth 2010a). Finally, there is likely to be much 
more analytical leverage from deeper probes into religious beliefs, but survey 
organizations find such surveys difficult to execute. 
What difference does all this make for American foreign policy? It is beyond 
the scope of this article to settle the thorny questions of how and to what extent 
public opinion influences foreign policy decision-making (see Holsti 2004; Page 
and Bouton 2006). Of course, foreign policy is primarily an executive prerogative 
and public opinion is most relevant in that context. American presidents have 
often taken into account and attempted to mobilize the forces of religion on 
behalf of their foreign policy objectives (Inboden 2008; Preston 2012). Their 
decisions may also be shaped by the fact that the foreign policy views of political 
activists and legislators appear to be influenced by religion in much the same 
way that public views are (Aguilar, Fordham and Lynch 1997; Green and Jackson 
2007; Guth 2007; Collins et al. 2011). All this suggests that public attitudes 
present both constraints and opportunities for presidential leadership, directly 
and indirectly through influence on other political elites. 
Nevertheless, analysts must exercise caution in interpreting the direction 
of influence. For example, even the most sensitive of the speculative work on 
Bush administration policies often attributed too much influence to his religious 
constituency (e.g., Marsden 2008). In fact, the closest observers of Bush’s 
decision-making scoff at arguments that he was simply responding to demands 
of his religious constituency on foreign policy. Nor, in fact, did Bush share all 
the theological emphases common within that constituency, despite journalistic 
claims to the contrary (cf. Laurent 2004, 11; Gerson 2007). It is clear, however, 
that public attitudes, shaped in part by religious factors, bolstered the president’s 
political support, whether for his invasion of Iraq, his support for Israel—or his 
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commitment to fighting AIDS in Africa.
The Obama administration has searched for the same kind of “supportive” 
religious coalition for its foreign policy. Both the president and former Secretary 
of State Clinton are veteran participants in the world of American religious 
politics, and they initially hoped to go beyond the confines of their religious 
electoral base (Green 2009) to build a broader religious coalition backing the 
cooperative internationalist dimension of American policy (Guth 2011c). This 
coalition has taken a considerably different form than that supporting the Bush 
administration, but by necessity draws on some elements of the same religious 
communities. This has been especially true given that the Administration has 
often exhibited a great deal of continuity with Bush policies—especially in its 
military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan—and has sometimes disappointed 
proponents of a vigorous multilateral foreign policy (Skidmore 2012). Althogh 
cooperative internationalism has a long history of elite support in many American 
religious communities, the specifics of such an approach have often been a much 
tougher sell at the grass-roots level (Hero 1973). Nevertheless, some observers 
see globalization providing a wider base for cooperative internationalism among 
American church people (Wuthnow 2009). If so, the president’s ability to take 
advantage of that development may help determine his success in mobilizing 
support for internationalist initiatives in his second term. 
The data also suggest, however, that Mr. Obama may well discover (and 
perhaps already has) that many secular Democrats (“Nones”) have little 
stomach for extensive American engagement abroad, whether militant or 
cooperative, preferring to retreat to a more isolationist stance (see Pew Research 
Center 2009, 12). Indeed, the great internal diversity of the Democratic Party’s 
religious constituency with its substantial contingents of internationalists, 
accommodationists and even isolationists, presents substantial obstacles to a 
coherent foreign policy. Perhaps the reluctance of the Obama administration 
to undertake more vigorous responses to the crises in Libya, Egypt, and Syria 
reflects not only presidential caution, bureaucratic influences, and international 
pressures, but the constraints of a Democratic religious constituency.
Religiously influenced constraints may also affect the current reassessment 
of foreign policy going on within the Republican Party. Retrospective public 
disapproval of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, fiscal concerns about defense 
costs and the loss of the 2012 presidential election have all contributed to a re-
evaluation of GOP foreign policy, with new leaders such as Senator Rand Paul 
urging a neo-isolationist approach. It is true that Republican foreign policy 
has shifted over time in line with presidential and elite perspectives (Dueck 
2010). Nevertheless, since World War II, such changes have occurred within 
a framework of Republican opinion that emphasized various combinations of 
hardliner and internationalist perspectives—shaped in considerable part by 
the GOP’s religious coalition. That coalition’s core has been transformed from 
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one based in Mainline Protestantism, with its internationalist vision, to one 
dominated at the grassroots and in Congress by Evangelicals and other religious 
traditionalists, preferring a hardline approach. There is no reason to think that 
the latter influences will disappear soon. All in all, scholars would be well-advised 
to continue their exploration of the religious roots of American foreign policy.
Religion and American Public Attitudes on War and Peace 247
Appendix: Militant and Cooperative Internationalism Measures
The militant internationalism score is derived from the first principal component 
from a principal components analysis of these 18 questions. This component 
had an eigenvalue of 5.486 and accounted for 30.5% of the variance. There were 
also two much smaller components with eigenvalues of 1.703 and 1.278; modest 
loadings on both were concentrated on a few items. The theta reliability score for 
this measure is .87.



















U.S. Policy Goal: Fight Terrorism
U.S. Policy Goal: Maintain U.S. Military Power
Critical Threat: Terrorism
Critical Threat: Iranian nuclear arms
U.S. Policy Goal: Prevent nuclear proliferation
Critical Threat: Islamist Groups in Pak/Afghan.
How effective: Military power
Taliban power a threat to U.S.
Defense Budget
Important that U.S. lead world
Approve airstrikes against terrorist camps
Critical Threat: China as world power
U.S. Policy Goal: Fight illegal immigration
Military strike on Iran’s nuclear buildup
U.S. greatest nation in the world
Approve assassinations of terrorist leaders
Approve ground troops against terrorist camps



















The cooperative internationalism score is derived from the first principal 
component from a principal components analysis of these 17 questions. This 
component had an eigenvalue of 5.304 and accounted for 31% of the variance. 
The analysis also produced three small components with eigenvalues of 1.683, 
1.566 and 1.134, none of which was substantively interpretable. The theta 
reliability score for this measure is .86.








U.S. Policy Goal: Strengthen UN
U.S. Policy Goal: Fight Climate Change
Strengthening UN has been effective
Favor new international treaty on climate change
How effective has the UN been in solving problems?
Critical Threat: Climate Change
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U.S. Policy Goal: Fight World Hunger
U.S. should cooperate with UN even if disagree
U.S. Policy Goal: Promoting Human Rights
Work against terrorism through the UN
When U.S. uses force, should be through UN
Should work more through NATO
Building new alliances effective in solving problems
Favor U.S. approval of International Criminal Court
U.S. Policy Goal: Spread Democracy
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